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Abstract 
Promoting environmentally friendly farming products is crucial to meeting consumer demand. Although 
governments implement policy measures to improve the environmental performance of the agriculture sector, 
their impacts are difficult to assess. This study analyses the performance of agri-environmental policies in 
Japan, by using the OECD’s policy impact model and reference level framework. In particular, it identifies the 
environmental impacts of three simulated agri-environmental policies based on farms’ characteristics. The 
results suggest that a policy mix of regulation and an incentive payment would reduce environmental impacts, 
suggesting that targeted approaches could improve the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental policies. 
Key words: Agri-environmental policies; Water quality; Climate change; Economic-biophysical model; 
Reference levels 
1 Introduction 
Environmental issues are rising in importance when consumers make decision on purchasing food (Grunert, 
2011; Banterle et al., 2012; Banterle and Ricci, 2013). A 2007 survey, for example, showed that more than 90% 
of Japanese consumers prefer to purchase agricultural products produced in an environmentally friendly way2 
under certain conditions3 (MAFF, 2007). According to this survey, approximately 30% of respondents purchase 
eco-friendly products since they want to contribute to environmental conservation. The Japanese 
government’s public opinion poll in 2008 also revealed an increasing expectation about the environmental role 
of agriculture in the future. Almost half (48.9%) of respondents expected agriculture and rural areas to 
preserve biodiversity and provide landscapes, while one in three (29.6%) expected water resources to be 
preserved and natural disasters such as landslides and floods to be prevented (CAO, 2008). 
These results clearly indicate that promoting environmentally friendly farming is crucial to meeting consumer 
demand as well as achieving a sustainable food system. However, although governments implement various 
agri-environmental policy measures in order to improve the environmental performance of the agriculture 
sector, their impacts on the environment are difficult to assess because of the existence of complex 
biophysical processes and heterogeneous agricultural and environmental conditions. 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) analysed the linkages between agricultural policies and environmental effects 
in Japan. In these studies, a decision-making economic model for representative farms was combined with a 
stylised site-specific biophysical model, which quantifies how different policy measures influence agricultural 
production practices and environmental effects (e.g. nitrogen (N) runoff and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions). 
                                                     
1  Note the views expressed in this article are the authors’ personal ones and do not necessarily reflect those of the organisations or countries. 
2 For example, organic products or agricultural products produced with a 50% reduction in the amount or usage of 
chemical fertiliser or synthetic agricultural chemicals (MAFF, 2007). 
3 Such as the existence of neighbouring markets, reliable labelling systems, and cheaper prices (MAFF, 2007). 
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This OECD Stylised Agri-environmental Policy Impact Model (SAPIM) estimated government budget outlays 
and social welfare, based on a monetary valuation of the environmental effects, as well as crop production. 
However, their models assumed a single farm type (business farm household) that operates six hectares of 
farmland, which is relatively large compared with the average farm size (ca. 2.1 ha) (MAFFSTAT). In addition, 
Japan is a mountainous island archipelago formed through volcanic action. Two-thirds (66%) of its area is 
forest, and only 30% of land is suitable for agriculture or urban use (OECD, 2009). Incorporating these hilly and 
mountainous Japanese lands into a model is thus important in order to understand the environmental impacts 
associated with agriculture and to develop suitable agri-environmental policies. 
Moreover, agri-environmental policies should be compared under a policy framework. For instance, OECD 
(2001) established a reference level framework that compared the degree to which agri-environmental 
policies were achieving their environmental targets and the distribution of costs for achieving these targets 
among stakeholders. Because markets for agri-environmental services in which consumers can express their 
demand are non-existent (Cooper et al., 2009), discussion on sharing the costs of managing agri-environmental 
issues is essential. However, despite its usefulness, policy simulations with modelling approaches based on this 
framework have been limited. 
Therefore, by building on this stream of previous research, this study analyses the degree to which agricultural 
policies meet consumer demand for environmentally friendly products in Japan, particularly by incorporating 
the following points: 
• Differentiating farms’ characteristics: The present study divides farm types into five categories: business 
farm household in non-mountainous areas (BFH-N-M) (average size: 6.1 ha), business farm household in 
mountainous areas (BFH-M) (4.3 ha), non-business farm household in non-mountainous areas (N-BFH-N-
M) (1.3 ha), non-business farm household in mountainous areas (N-BFH-M) (0.9 ha), and the average 
farming household (AVERAGE) (2.1 ha). The related farming costs and other parameters are also 
categorised into these five groups. 
• Including different environmental impacts depending on farm type: Different runoff rates are used for 
farms in non-mountainous and mountainous areas since N runoff rates differ depending on the slope of 
the farmland (see Yamamoto et al., 2008). 
• Addressing new agri-environmental policy scenarios that have not been covered in previous works: Three 
policy scenarios (regulation, environmental payment, and the combination of both) are selected in this 
study in order to examine who should be remunerated and who is liable for charges, based on the OECD 
reference level framework (OECD, 2001). 
Overall, this study aims to identify suitable agri-environmental policies for improving environmental effects 
(e.g. water quality and GHG emissions), taking into consideration different farm characteristics (e.g. farm size, 
slope of farmland). The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 explains the application of the empirical framework. Section 4 discusses the 
reference level framework used in the policy simulations. Section 5 provides the results of the policy 
simulations, and Section 6 concludes the discussion. 
2 Theoretical framework 
In the SAPIM, land is divided into rectangular parcels of the same size (0.1 hectare) and of homogeneous land 
quality (productivity: q; although land quality differs by parcel). Land use is classified into rice, upland crop 
production (or cultivation), and abandonment in this model; wheat is assumed to be an upland crop (Figure1). 
In the model, the optimal land use allocation and N application (the combination of chemical and organic 
fertilisers) are considered based on generating private profits to farmers and social profits by taking 
environmental externalities into consideration. 
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Figure 1. Spatial characteristics used in the Japanese SAPIM 
Source: OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012). 
The model consists of the following functions: 1) profit functions with quadratic nitrogen response functions 
for cultivated crops (rice and wheat), 2) exponential N runoff and purification functions, 3) GHG emissions 
functions that combine the CH4, N2O, and carbon sequestration functions and 4) social welfare functions. 
Farmers’ profits are maximised under exogenous crop prices and input costs (Figure2). The model thus 
estimates social welfare, crop production, N runoff, and GHG emissions under different policy scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Japanese SAPIM structure  
Source: Authors. 
2.1 Land use allocation 
This study follows the approaches taken by OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012). Let G(q) denote the cumulative 
distribution of q (0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 1), while g(q) is its density. We assume that g(q) is continuous and differentiable. 
The total amount of land in the region is 
 G= ∫ 𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10  (1) 
It is assumed that only rice and wheat are cultivated in this region, i = 1,2. Let 𝐿𝑗(𝑞) denote the share of land of 
quality q allocated to crop i. Then, the total amount of land allocated to rice and wheat is given by 
 𝐻𝑖 = ∫ 𝐿𝑖(𝑞)𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10 , i = 1,2  (2)  
Land abandonment is not considered in the theoretical part in order to simplify the discussion. 
2.2 Profit function 
It is assumed that rice and wheat are produced under constant returns to scale. The output of each crop per 
unit of land area is denoted by 𝑦𝑖 , while yield is a function of land quality q and the application of N fertiliser to 
the agricultural field 𝑥𝑖  (amount of application depends on land quality q), 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖(𝑞), 𝑞). The applied 
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amount of fertiliser 𝑥𝑖  is the combination of chemical fertiliser 𝑥𝑐𝑖  and organic fertiliser𝑥𝑜𝑖 . This production 
function is increasing and concave in fertiliser and land quality, that is 𝑓𝑥𝑖
𝑖 > 0, 𝑓𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 0, and 𝑓𝑞𝑖 > 0, 𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑖 < 0. 
Further, we assume that arable land can be allocated to either rice or wheat. The profit from agricultural 
production is thus expressed as 
 π𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖(𝑞), 𝑞) − c𝑥𝑖(𝑞)  for 𝑖 = 1,2 (3) 
Here, 𝑝𝑖  refers to the price of crops and c to the N fertiliser price, which are both taken as given. 
The use of organic fertiliser increases yields depending on the application:  𝛷𝑖(𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞)) , defined as 
1<  𝛷𝑖(𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞))  with  𝛷𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑖 > 0  and  𝛷𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑖 < 0 . At the same time, the additional costs of collecting, 
transporting, and spreading organic fertiliser are incorporated into the profit function. In the presence of this 
yield-increasing effect and the additional costs of organic application, profit function (3) is modified as follows: 
 π𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑐𝑖(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞), 𝑞)𝛷𝑖(𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞)) − 𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑐𝑖(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞))  for 𝑖 = 1,2 (4) 
2.3  Nitrogen runoff and purification function 
Two environmental effects are assumed: water quality impacts through chemical fertiliser runoff and GHG 
emissions through the application of chemical and organic fertilisers. Aggregate N runoff is a function of 
chemical fertiliser use. Suppose that the N content in organic fertiliser is not included in the N runoff function, 
because this N content is only a serious problem for very large applications. The runoff of nutrients (kg) from 
each parcel is expressed as a function of the amount of chemical fertiliser applied 𝑥𝑐𝑖: 
 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖[𝑥𝑐𝑖(𝑞)] for 𝑖 = 1,2 (5) 
with 𝑣𝑥 > 0 and 𝑣𝑥𝑥 > 0. Thus, the runoff function is convex in fertiliser application. It is well known that 
paddy fields improve local water quality by removing nitrogen through denitrification and absorption. When 
the total nitrogen inflow in the paddy field water exceeds the total outflow of nitrogen discharged from the 
paddy field water, the paddy field works as a nitrogen removal site, which means 𝑧𝑖  is negative. Then, the total 
runoff from the land area devoted to rice and wheat is 
 𝑧 = ∫ {𝑣1[𝑥𝑐1(𝑞)]𝐿1(𝑞) + 𝑣2[𝑥𝑐2(𝑞)]𝐿2(𝑞)}𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10      (6) 
The monetary valuation of runoff damage (purification benefit) is defined by a valuation function, D(z), which 
is assumed to be convex (𝐷(𝑧)𝑥 > 0,𝐷(𝑧)𝑥𝑥 > 0). 
2.4 GHG emissions and sequestration function 
Regarding GHG emissions, agriculture is an important anthropogenic source of CH4 and N2O. In addition to 
GHG emissions, agricultural soils serve as a carbon sink. 
2.4.1 CH4 emissions 
The impact of organic fertiliser for CH4 emissions is critical (Yan et al., 2005), and the amount of the applied 
material and CH4 emissions can be described by a response curve. CH4 is generated if soil is maintained in an 
anaerobic state. Because upland soils are normally oxidative and not in an anaerobic state, CH4 is not 
produced. CH4 emissions are thus denoted as 
 𝐶𝐻4 = ∫ 𝑚[𝑥𝑜1(𝑞)]𝐿1(𝑞)𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10  (7) 
with 𝑚𝑥 > 0 and 𝑚𝑥𝑥 < 0. Thus, the runoff function is assumed to be concave in the application of organic 
fertiliser (Yan et al., 2005; IPCC, 2006). 
2.4.2 N2O emissions 
Following the guidelines of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, N2O emissions are assumed to be 
a combination of direct emissions (denitrification) and indirect emissions (associated with atmospheric 
deposition and N runoff): 
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 𝑁2𝑂 = ∫ {𝑛1[𝑥𝑐1(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜1(𝑞), 𝑧1]𝐿1(𝑞) + 𝑛2[𝑥𝑐2(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜2(𝑞), 𝑧2]𝐿2(𝑞)}𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10     (8) 
2.4.3 Carbon sequestration 
Soil carbon stock is affected heavily by fertiliser management. The appropriate amounts of organic fertiliser 
can increase the soil carbon content and reduce total GHG emissions. The carbon sequestration function is 
given by 
 𝑆𝑒𝑞 = ∫ {𝑠1[𝑥𝑜1(𝑞)]𝐿1(𝑞) + 𝑠2[𝑥𝑜2(𝑞)]𝐿2(𝑞)}𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10  (9) 
with 𝑠𝑥 > 0 and 𝑠𝑥𝑥 < 0. Thus, the sequestration function is concave in the application of organic fertiliser. 
Consequently, net GHG emissions are expressed as follows: 
𝑒 = � 𝑚[𝑥𝑜1(𝑞)]𝐿1(𝑞)𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞1
0
 
+∫ {𝑛1[𝑥𝑐1(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜1(𝑞), 𝑧1]𝐿1(𝑞) + 𝑛2[𝑥𝑐2(𝑞), 𝑥𝑜2(𝑞), 𝑧2]𝐿2(𝑞)}𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞10     (10) 
−� {𝑠1[𝑥𝑜1(𝑞)]𝐿1(𝑞) + 𝑠2[𝑥𝑜2(𝑞)]𝐿2(𝑞)}𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞1
0
    
The monetary valuation of emissions damage (sequestration benefit) is defined by the valuation function, 
𝐺𝑊(𝑒), which is assumed to be concave (𝐺𝑊(𝑒)𝑥 > 0,𝐺𝑊(𝑒)𝑥𝑥 < 0). 
2.5 Social welfare function 
Chemical fertiliser affects both yield and environmental externalities. Moreover, there is a trade-off in the 
application of organic fertilisers: while organic fertiliser can help maintain soil fertility (yield-increasing effect) 
and increase carbon sequestration, it can increase CH4 emissions and be a source of water quality problems. 
Therefore, a socially appropriate amount of N application must be decided by considering these effects. The 
social welfare maximisation problem can now be expressed as 
 𝑆𝑊 = ∫ ∑ �𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖(𝑞), 𝑞)𝛷𝑖�𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑞)� − 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖(𝑞)�𝐿𝑖(𝑞)2𝑖=1 𝑔(𝑞)𝑑𝑞 − 𝐷(𝑧) − 𝐺𝑊[𝑒(𝑚,𝑛, 𝑠)]  10 (11) 
Social planners choose the use of inputs (chemical and organic fertilisers) for each parcel under heterogeneous 
land productivity levels. The first-best optimum is solved as follows:  𝑆𝑊𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝐷′(𝑧) 𝜕𝑣𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑐𝑖 − 𝐺𝑊′(𝑒) 𝜕𝑛𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑐𝑖 = 0       (12) 
𝑆𝑊𝑥𝑜𝑖
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑖 𝛷𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑖 − 𝐷′(𝑧) 𝜕𝑣𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑖 − 𝐺𝑊′(𝑒) �𝜕𝑚𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑖 + 𝜕𝑛𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑖 − 𝜕𝑠𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑖� = 0 (13) 
Based on the optimal use of inputs and thus profits for each crop from a given land quality, land is allocated to 
the highest social return use in each parcel. The unique value of switching land quality 𝑞1 is defined as 
 π1∗(𝑞1) − D1∗(𝑞1) − GW1∗(𝑞1) = π2∗(𝑞1) − D2∗(𝑞1) − GW2∗(𝑞1) (14) 
Consequently, land is allocated to crops by taking account of not only profits, but also the effect of the land 
allocation on N runoff and GHG emissions. The private optimum can easily be extracted from equations (11) to 
(14), under which the farmer ignores the effects of environmental externalities. By setting the marginal 
damage (benefit) to zero, π1∗(𝑞1) = π2∗(𝑞1) is obtained. 
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3  Empirical framework  
As explained in the Introduction, this study categorises farms into five types: business farm household in non-
mountainous areas (j=1), business farm household in mountainous areas (j=2), non-business farm household in 
non-mountainous areas (j=3), non-business farm household in mountainous areas (j=4), and average farm 
household (j=5), based on farm size data provided by MAFFSTAT. We follow OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) to 
estimate the profit function, nitrogen response function, N runoff and purification function, GHG emissions 
and sequestration function, and social welfare function for each farm type. 
3.1 Profit function 
Farmers’ profits from production in the absence of government intervention are given by 
 π𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑗 − c𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑜𝑖𝑗    for 𝑖 = 1,2 and j = 1,2,3,4,5 (15) 
where 𝑝𝑖  refers to the price of crops, 𝑦𝑖𝑗  to the yield/0.1 ha, c  to the fertiliser (nitrogen) price, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  to the 
amount of N application, and 𝑜𝑖𝑗  to other costs. 
The model employs a quadratic nitrogen response function, 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗2 , estimated for crop 1 
(rice) and crop 2 (wheat) for each farm type (j=1,2,3,4,5). When farmers consider using organic fertiliser 𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑗  in 
addition to (or instead of) chemical fertiliser 𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑗, total N application 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is equal to the summation of the N 
content of the fertiliser and organic matter. The N content in chemical fertiliser is assumed to be 21–46% 
based on MAFFSTAT. Similarly, Okayama Prefecture (2008) set the average N content in organic fertiliser as 
0.7% and the yield efficiency of organic fertiliser as 60% compared with 100% for chemical fertiliser. 
It is assumed that the positive impact of using 1 tonne of organic matter on yields is 𝛷𝑖(𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑗), while that of 
paddy is assumed to be 5% and that of wheat 10%, based on field survey data (e.g. NARO, 2007; Shibahara et 
al., 1999). Taking into consideration the additional cost for the application of organic matter, profit function 
(15) is now expressed as follows: 
π𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖�𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗2 �𝛷𝑖�𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑗� − c𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑗 − �𝑐𝑜𝑝 + 𝑐𝑜𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠�𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑗 − 𝑜𝑖𝑗     for 𝑖 = 1,2 and j = 1,2,3,4,5  (16) 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑝 refers to the price of organic matter (JPY/tonne), 𝑐𝑜𝑡 to transportation cost (JPY/tonne), and 𝑐𝑜𝑠  to 
spreading cost (JPY/tonne). The parameters for the model are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
Parameter values in the numerical application 
Parameter Symbol Value Parameter Symbol Value 
Price of crop:  JPY/kg Other cost:  JPY/0.1ha 
    Rice P1 194.3
     Rice   
    Wheat P2 50.6 BFH-N-M O11 61 891 
 Price of chemical fertiliser (nitrogen)   JPY/kg BFH-M O12 71 614
  C 363 N-BFH-N-M O13 77 721 
 Organic matter:  JPY/t N-BFH-M O14 115 813 
    Price of organic matter Cop 5 000 AVERAGE O15 70 570 
    Transportation cost Cot 1 000     Wheat   
    Spreading cost Cos 2 000 BFH-N-M O21 37 113 
 
   BFH-M O22 42 818 
    N-BFH-N-M O23 39 107
    N-BFH-M O24 42 014
    AVERAGE O25 38 073
 Source: MAFFSTAT, MAFF(2008) 
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3.2 Nitrogen response function 
3.2.1 Rice paddy 
The quadratic nitrogen response function of rice paddy was estimated by OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012), 
based on Toriyama (2002) as follows: 
 𝑦1 = 368.6 + 31.7𝑥1 − 1.4𝑥12 (17) 
Land quality q and farm types j are incorporated into response function (17) through the parameters 𝛼1𝑗  and 
𝛽1𝑗  by calibrating the response function to reflect the yield spread in the field survey data of Toriyama (2002). 
Thus, the quadratic nitrogen response function of rice paddy is expressed as 
𝑦1𝑗 = 368.6 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑥1𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑗𝑥1𝑗2        where   22.19 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 41.21, 0.98 ≤ 𝛽1 ≤ 1.82,          (18) 
 𝛼1𝑗 = 𝑒0𝑗 + 𝑒1𝑗𝑞,      𝛽1𝑗 = µ0𝑗 + µ1𝑗𝑞         
When q is distributed uniformly among parcels, parameters 𝑒0𝑗 , 𝑒1𝑗, µ0𝑗 , and µ1𝑗are estimated (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. 
Rice paddy parameter values in different farm types 
 𝒆𝟎𝒋 𝒆𝟏𝒋 µ𝟎𝒋 µ𝟏𝒋 
BFH-N-M 21.87 0.32 0.97 0.01 
BFH-M 21.74 0.45 0.96 0.02 
N-BFH-N-M 20.61 1.56 0.91 0.07 
N-BFH-M 19.81 2.38 0.88 0.11 
AVERAGE 21.24 0.95 0.94 0.04 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
3.2.2 Wheat 
The quadratic nitrogen response function of wheat (converted from rice cultivation) was estimated by OECD 
(2010) and Sasaki (2012) by using the datasets of the National Agricultural Centre as follows: 
 𝑦2 = 214.9 + 45.6𝑥2 − 1.2𝑥22 (19) 
Data that can estimate the quadratic nitrogen response function of wheat is limited in Japan. National 
Agricultural Centre data are based on the highest yields from research fields (maximum yield 700–800 kg/0.1 
ha). Therefore, function (19) may not be a representative average response function and thus wheat yield is 
adjusted based on average yield data depending on farm size (the national average wheat yield is 388 kg/0.1 
ha; MAFFSTAT). For this, we use the multiplier Λ𝑗  and calibrate the response function to reflect the yield 
spread. Land quality q and farm types j are incorporated into response function (19) through the parameters 
𝛼2𝑗  and 𝛽2𝑗, making the quadratic nitrogen response function of wheat 
 𝑦2𝑗 = 214.9 + 𝛼2𝑗𝑥2𝑗 − 𝛽2𝑗𝑥2𝑗2        where    11.4Λ𝑗 ≤ 𝛼2𝑗 ≤ 45.6Λ𝑗 , 0.3Λ𝑗 ≤ 𝛽2𝑗 ≤ 1.2Λ𝑗,        (20) 
𝛼2𝑗 = ℎ0𝑗 + ℎ1𝑗𝑞 ,  𝛽2𝑗 = 𝜂0𝑗 + 𝜂1𝑗𝑞         
Subsequently, each parameter is obtained as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. 
Wheat parameter values in different farm types 
 𝚲𝒋 𝒉𝟎 𝒉𝟏 𝜼𝟎 𝜼𝟏 
BFH-N-M 0.9 9.75 0.51 0.26 0.01 
BFH-M 0.8 8.47 0.65 0.22 0.02 
N-BFH-N-M 0.5 4.28 1.43 0.11 0.04 
N-BFH-M 0.4 2.85 1.71 0.08 0.05 
AVERAGE 0.6 5.81 1.03 0.15 0.03 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
3.3. Nitrogen runoff and purification function 
3.3.1 Rice paddy 
It is difficult to describe the relationship between N application and its environmental impact because N runoff 
from irrigation and meteoric water might affect the nitrogen balance in paddy fields. Taking into consideration 
the large effect of fertiliser application on N runoff (Kunimatsu and Muraoka, 1989), the relationship between 
N application and runoff is estimated by using field survey data collected by Shiga Prefecture in 2007: 
𝑧1𝑗 = 0.0062𝑒0.465𝑥1𝑗 − 1.14  (21)  
where 𝑧1𝑗  refers to N runoff or purification and 𝑥1𝑗  to the application amount of N. Paddy fields either serve as 
N removal or pollution sites depending on the agricultural activities and nitrogen concentration of irrigation 
water. 
3.3.2 Wheat 
Because soil condition, crops, cropping season, and methodological conditions all affect N runoff, the 
exponential relationship between N application and N runoff is estimated based on Japanese field data 
collated by the National Institute for Ago-Environmental Science: 
𝑧2𝑗 = 1.129𝑒0.114𝑥2𝑗   (22) 
where 𝑧2𝑗  refers to N runoff and 𝑥2𝑗  the application amount of N. 
3.3.3 Nitrogen runoff and slope 
To reflect the N runoff–farmland slope relationship, this study introduces the parameter φ𝑠. Thus, functions 
(21) and (22) can be rewritten as 
𝑧1𝑗 = φ𝑠(0.0062𝑒0.465𝑥1𝑗 − 1.14) (23)  
𝑧2𝑗 = φ𝑠(1.129𝑒0.114𝑥2𝑗)             (24) 
Yamamoto et al. (2008) studies the relationship between slope and N runoff in mountainous areas and 
estimates the linear relationship as R = 0.0059d + 0.0612              (25) 
where R refers to N runoff and 𝑑 to slope degree. In Japan, the slope of farmland (both rice paddy and upland) 
is classified into two categories: steep (2.86 degrees for rice paddy and 15 degrees for upland) and gentle (0.57 
degrees for rice paddy and 8 degrees for upland). Subsequently, φ𝑠 is obtained as presented in Table 4, and 
multiplied for business farm household in mountainous areas and non-business farm household in 
mountainous areas. 
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Table 4. 
Slope parameter values 
 𝝋𝒔 
Steep slope rice paddy 1.28 
Gentle slope rice paddy 1.06 
Steep slope upland 2.45 
Gentle slope upland 1.77 
   Source: Authors’ calculation. 
3.4 GHG emissions and sequestration function 
Rice cultivation is the main anthropogenic source of CH4 emissions. Fertiliser application and ploughing organic 
soil create ammonium ions inside the soil, leading to N2O emissions. In addition to CH4 and N2O emissions, 
agricultural soils serve as a carbon sink. Net GHG emissions are therefore explained by converting CH4 and 
N2O into CO2 equivalent (tonne) (IPCC, 2006): GHG(𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑞) = 21𝐶𝐻4 + 310𝑁2𝑂 + 𝐶𝑂2           (26) 
3.4.1 CH4 emissions 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) estimated CH4 emissions (t CH4/0.1 ha/yr) as follows: 
𝐶𝐻4 = 0.001296 × (1 + 1.4𝑥𝑜𝑖)0.59                                               (27) 
In this study, the estimated values of CH4 and 𝑥0𝑖  depend on farm type j. However, in upland areas, CH4 is not 
generated because such soils are normally oxidative and aerobic. 
3.4.2 N2O emissions 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) estimated the N2O emissions associated with fertiliser application as 
𝑁2𝑂𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑖 = 11000 × 𝐸𝐹𝑑𝑖 × 𝑥𝑖 × 4428
 
(28) 
where N2Odirect_i refers to direct N2O emissions derived from fertiliser application in land use i (t N2O), 1/1000 
is the conversion of units from kg to tonne, EFdi is the emissions factors (kgN2O-N/kgN) (for paddy: 0.0031; for 
upland crops: 0.0062), and xi is the amount of N application (kgN). Moreover, 44/28 represents the conversion 
of N2O-N emissions into N2O emissions. In this study, the estimated values of N2Odirect_i and 𝑥𝑖  depend on farm 
type j. 
Further, when Eadi is N2O emissions associated with atmospheric deposition (kgN2O) and Eli emissions 
associated with N leaching and runoff (kgN2O), indirect emissions N2Oindirect_i is expressed as follows: 
𝑁2𝑂𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑖 = 𝐸𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝐸𝑙𝑖   (29) 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) estimated emissions from atmospheric deposition as 
𝐸𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 11000 × 0.01 × 𝑅𝐹 × 𝑥𝑖 × 4428  (30) 
where 0.01 is the emissions factor (kgN2O-N/kgN), 𝑅𝐹 the rate of deposition from fertiliser (chemical fertiliser: 
0.1; organic fertiliser: 0.2), and xi N application. In this study, the estimated values of Eadi  and 𝑥𝑖  again depend 
on farm type j. 
Emissions from N leaching and runoff (Eli) were defined by OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) as 
𝐸𝑙𝑖 = 11000 × 0.0124 × 𝑍𝑖(𝑥𝑖) × 4428  (31) 
where 0.0124 is the emissions factor from N leaching and runoff (kgN2O-N/kgN) and zi the runoff amount 
(kgN). The estimated values of Eli, 𝑥𝑖, and zi also depend on farm type j. 
3.4.3 CO2 emissions and sequestration 
Lastly, the amount of carbon sequestration (tonne) is expressed as follows: 
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𝐶𝑂2𝑖 = ∑𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑖 × 4412
  
(32) 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) estimated the functions for paddy and upland fields by using data from 
MAFFSTAT as follows: 
𝑆𝑒𝑞1 = 0.0062𝑥𝑜𝑖2 + 0.052𝑥𝑜𝑖   (33) 
𝑆𝑒𝑞2 = 0.0013𝑥𝑜𝑖2 + 0.022𝑥𝑜𝑖   (34) 
Similarly, the estimated values of 𝑆𝑒𝑞1, 𝑆𝑒𝑞2, and 𝑥0𝑖  depend on farm type j. 
3.5 Social welfare function 
The monetary valuation of environmental impacts is used to aggregate each environmental effect and then 
this is combined with the profit function. The social welfare function for each farm type can be expressed as SW = ∫ ∑𝜋𝑖𝑗10 − 𝛼𝑧1𝑗 − 𝛽𝑧2𝑗 − 𝛾𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑖𝑗    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1.2, 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5              (35) where α = �674,   𝑧𝑖𝑗 > 06563, 𝑧𝑖𝑗 < 0,      β = 674   ,  𝛾 = 7039               
where πij refers to the farmer’s profit function, zij to the amount of N runoff (purification), and GHGij to total 
GHG emissions. 
OECD (2010) and Sasaki (2012) estimated the monetary valuation of N purification and runoff as 6563 and 674 
JPY/kg, respectively based on Shiratani et al. (2004, 2008), who used the replacement cost method. Although 
other monetary valuation methods can be applied, stated preference methods (contingent valuation and 
choice experiment) are difficult to apply because of the unfamiliarity of N runoff and purification, which might 
lead to an unsuitable valuation (Hanley et al., 1997). Moreover, no such precise calculation exists in Japan. 
Further, these studies estimated the monetary valuation of GHG emissions as 7039 JPY/Ct based on Barker et 
al. (2007), which compared modelling estimations of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets. 
4 Reference level framework for the policy simulations 
Although consumers expect farmers to adopt good farming practices and demand environmentally friendly 
agricultural products, they do not necessarily bear the associated costs. However, without economic incentives, 
farmers may not adopt these practices because they incur additional costs. Policymakers must thus consider 
the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental policies, especially which party should bear the costs of achieving 
environmental targets. For this purpose, OECD (2001) developed the reference framework (Figure 3) for 
examining the impacts of agri-environmental policies. 
Environmental reference levels are defined as the minimum level of environmental quality that farmers are 
obliged to provide at their own expense. Environmental targets are defined as the desired (voluntary) levels of 
environmental quality that go beyond the minimum requirements for the agricultural sector in a given country 
(OECD, 2001, 2010). If agricultural activities provide agri-environmental public goods above the reference level, 
this provides benefits for which farmers or landowners may need to be compensated. When agricultural 
activities push the level of environmental services below the reference level, farmers are required to restore 
the reference level at their own expense (the Polluter Pays Principle) (OECD, 1997). 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between environmental targets and reference levels for three cases (where 
X represents environmental targets [XT], reference levels [XR], and current farming practices [XC]). Cases A to C 
represent identical environmental outcomes and allocations of farm resources. What differs among them is 
the distribution of costs associated with achieving the defined environmental target (OECD, 2001, 2010): 
• In Case A, current farming practices (XC) provide an environmental performance below the reference 
level (XR). In this case, farmers are emitting pollution (XC<XR), and they must adopt farming practices to 
achieve XT at their own expense. If not, the government may charge a penalty to induce compliance. 
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• In Case B, current farming practices achieve an environmental performance corresponding to the chosen 
reference level (XC=XR), which is below XT. In this case, farmers may need to be compensated for changing 
from XC to those practices required to achieve XT.  
• In Case C, current farming practices (XC) provide an environmental performance below XT, but with XR 
above the environmental performance level of XC and below XT. To improve their environmental 
performance, farmers must adopt appropriate farming practices at their own expense up to XR otherwise 
the government may charge a penalty. Requirements for farmers to improve their environmental 
performance beyond XR to reach XT may also need to be remunerated. 
Despite the usefulness of this reference framework, the environmental impacts of agri-environmental policies 
have rarely been modelled. Therefore, following the framework in Figure 3, this study carried out three policy 
simulations. In all three, the environmental target was set as half the current chemical fertiliser application in 
line with the definition of agricultural products produced in an environmentally friendly way in Japan (MAFF, 
2007). Moreover, payments were set to half the application of chemical fertiliser currently used by average 
farming household compared with the private optimum (198 kg). Thus, 
Case A
Case B
Case C
+Environmental Quality
Environmental 
target level
XC
XT
XT
XT=XR
XR=XC
XC XR
XT
XC
XR
= Environmental target
= Current farming practice
= Reference level
= Environmental charges
= Environmental payments
 
Figure 3. Environmental targets and reference levels 
   Source: Adapted from Uetake (2013) (originally from OECD (2001)). 
• Simulation A (corresponding to Case A): A 50% reduction in the application of chemical fertiliser 
• Simulation B (corresponding to Case B): An environmental payment (900 JPY per N kg reduction) for 
achieving the environmental target 
• Simulation C (corresponding to Case C): A policy mix of regulation and a payment, namely a 25% reduction 
in the application of chemical fertiliser plus an environmental payment (900 JPY per N kg reduction) for 
achieving the environmental target 
Tetsuya Uetake and Hiroki Sasaki 
 
263 
5 Policy simulations and results 
The model described herein estimated crop production, N runoff, GHG emissions, budget outlays, and social 
welfare under these three scenarios. Although Japan has a rice production adjustment programme and sets a 
rice production quota to prevent a drop in the rice price, these external factors were excluded from our model. 
To reflect this impact, the rice price was rather assumed to decrease by 4.66%, which was estimated from data 
provided by OECD (2009). In addition, as prior conditions, Japanese direct payments for wheat production 
(non-environmental payments, 6360 JPY/60 kg) were incorporated into the model to reflect farmers’ actual 
situations. Compared with the rice price (11,660 JPY/60 kg), the wheat price is much cheaper (3033 JPY/60 kg). 
Without payments for wheat production, farmers hardly produce wheat in Japan. 
5.1 Private and social optimum 
The first analysis compares the private and social optima. Farmers maximise their profit by ignoring both 
positive and negative externalities (private optimum), whereas government planners maximise both farmers 
and society’s profit by incorporating both positive and negative externalities (social optimum). 
Table 5 shows the land use allocation and total production of rice and wheat. Under the social optimum, 
farmers produce only rice except non-business farm household in mountainous areas, since rice paddy has a 
nitrogen purification function and offers larger benefits to society. Under the private optimum, rice paddy is 
not cultivated at all owing to the relatively high cost of rice production as well as limited nitrogen response 
characteristics even on high-quality land. Wheat is mainly cultivated on parcels in non-mountainous areas by 
business farm household, because it has a relatively high nitrogen response on high-quality land. In addition, 
this simulation allocated some land abandonment for non-business farm household in mountainous areas 
because of the prevailing high production costs. More land is abandoned under the social optimum because of 
high N runoff rates owing to the steep slopes. The areas of abandoned land, rice, and upland crops in 2010–11 
were approximately 0.19 million ha (8%), 1.53 million ha (65%), and 0.62 million ha (27%), respectively. The 
share of the simulation results of each (abandoned land 2%, rice 72%, wheat 25%) were reasonably close to 
actual usage, suggesting that the results represent the reality of current land use. 
Table 5. 
Private and social optimums: Comparing land use and total production 
 Farmer Land use (parcel) Total production 
Abandoned land  Rice  Wheat  Rice (kg) Wheat (kg) 
Private optimum BFH-N-M 0 44 17 23 847 10 431 
BFH-M 0 34 9 18 567 5 222 
N-BFH-N-M 0 13 0 7 263 0 
N-BFH-M 3 0 6 0 2 150 
AVERAGE 0 21 0 11 733 0 
Social optimum  BFH-N-M 0 61 0 34 749 0 
BFH-M 0 43 0 24 488 0 
N-BFH-N-M 0 13 0 7 403 0 
N-BFH-M 6 0 3 0 1 155 
AVERAGE 0 21 0 11 959 0 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Farmers maximise yields by using relatively larger amounts of chemical fertiliser under the private optimum 
than under the social optimum. In the latter, more organic fertiliser is used (Table 6). Under the private 
optimum, the application of chemical fertiliser leads to N runoff, but not for business farm household in 
mountainous areas and non-business farm household in non-mountainous areas because they do not produce 
wheat, only rice. Even under the social optimum, non-business farm household in mountainous areas generate 
N runoff due to wheat production, although other farm types do not (owing to the N purification function of 
rice paddy; Table 7). The impact of CH4 emissions and carbon sequestration through the application of organic 
fertiliser on GHG emissions is fairly limited under the private optimum. By comparison, organic fertiliser has 
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partially been substituted for chemical fertiliser under the social optimum, which significantly decreases net 
GHG emissions (Tables 6 and 7). 
Table 6. 
Private and social optimums: Comparing fertiliser use 
 Farmer Fertiliser use (total) 
Rice Wheat Total 
Chemical (kg) 
Total Organic 
(t) Chemical (kg) Organic 
(t) 
Chemical (kg) Organic 
(t) 
Private 
optimum  
BFH-N-M 418 11 249 13 667 24 
BFH-M 322 9 133 7 455 15 
N-BFH-N-M 122 4 0 0 122 4 
N-BFH-M 0 0 87 2 87 2 
AVERAGE 198 6 0 0 198 6 
Social 
optimum  
BFH-N-M 404 46 0 0 404 46 
BFH-M 285 33 0 0 285 33 
N-BFH-N-M 86 10 0 0 86 10 
N-BFH-M 0 0 26 3 26 3 
AVERAGE 139 16 0 0 139 16 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Table 7. 
Private and social optimums: Comparing environmental effects 
 Farmer Nitrogen1 GHG emission and sequestration1 
N runoff (purification) (kg) CH4(t)    N2O (t)   CO2 (t)   Total (t)   
Private optimum  BFH-N-M 74.65  1.43  2.89  -3.05  1.26  
BFH-M 33.06  1.11  1.78  -2.14  0.75  
N-BFH-N-M -8.36  0.43  0.31  -0.68  0.06  
N-BFH-M 39.88  0.00  0.60  -0.14  0.45  
AVERAGE -13.51  0.70  0.50  -1.09  0.10  
Social optimum  BFH-N-M -61.28  2.54  1.61  -8.03  -3.87  
BFH-M -43.20  1.79  1.14  -5.66  -2.73  
N-BFH-N-M -13.06  0.54  0.34  -1.71  -0.82  
N-BFH-M 8.97  0.00  0.22  -0.20  0.02  
AVERAGE -21.10  0.88  0.56  -2.76  -1.33  
1. The minus represents the purification for nitrogen and the sequestration for carbon. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Under the private optimum, social welfare is always lower than that under the social optimum. Consequently, 
a farmer’s profit in this case is lower than the profit of a farmer under the private optimum (Table 8). Non-
business farm household in mountainous areas lose the most profits compared with the private optimum, 
since some parcels are better to be abandoned because of their low productivity and high negative 
environmental impacts owing to steep slopes. 
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Table 8. 
Private and social optimums: Comparing private profits and social welfare 
 Farmer Private 
profits 
(1000 
JPY) 
Profits/ 
Private 
Optimum 
Runoff 
damage 
(purification 
benefit)1 
GHG emission 
damage 
(Sequestration 
benefit)1 
Social 
welfare 
(1000 
JPY) 
Social 
welfare/ 
Social 
Optimum 
Private 
optimum  
BFH-N-M 2 262 1.00 0.4 9 2 252 0.88 
BFH-M 1 149 1.00 -44 5 1 188 0.85 
N-BFH-N-M 262 1.00 -55 0.4 316 0.92 
N-BFH-M 38 1.00 71 3 -36 -4.18 
AVERAGE 573 1.00 -89 1 661 0.94 
Social 
optimum  
BFH-N-M 2 144 0.95 -402 -27 2 573 1.00 
BFH-M 1 093 0.95 -284 -19 1 396 1.00 
N-BFH-N-M 251 0.96 -86 -6 343 1.00 
N-BFH-M 25 0.64 16 0.1 8 1.00 
AVERAGE 556 0.97 -138 -9 704 1.00 
1. The minus represents the purification for nitrogen and the sequestration for carbon. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
5.2 Agri-environmental policy simulations 
The second analysis compares the three above-mentioned policy options for reducing N runoff and GHG 
emissions. These policy scenarios, which assume profit maximisation by farmers, are regulation, 
environmental payment, and a combination of both. Organic fertiliser is substituted for chemical fertiliser 
substantially compared with the private optimum in all three simulations (Tables 6 and 9). 
Table 10 summarises the land use allocation and total production of rice and wheat under the three 
simulations. Business farm household increase rice production compared with the private optimum under the 
regulation policy, because wheat production is more responsive to N application than rice is. Halving the N 
application significantly reduces wheat yields so that producing rice become more profitable on some parcels. 
On the contrary, the environmental payment policy allocates more land to wheat because the payment is 
based on reducing nitrogen compared with the amount under the private optimum (where farmers use more 
nitrogen for wheat than for rice). Therefore, if an environmental payment were introduced, farmers would 
receive larger payments by producing wheat than by producing rice. Thus, farmers would produce more wheat. 
Finally, the policy mix allocates more parcels to rice compared with the payment policy, but fewer parcels 
versus the regulation policy.  
Table 9. 
Agri-environmental policy simulations: Comparing fertiliser use 
 Farmer Fertiliser use (total) 
Rice (kg) Wheat (kg) Total Chemical 
(kg) 
Total Organic 
(t) Chemical Organic  Chemical  Organic  
Regulation 
(N 50% reduction) 
BFH-N-M 237 48 81 16 317 65 
BFH-M 184 38 29 6 214 44 
N-BFH-N-M 61 13 0 0 61 13 
N-BFH-M 0 0 37 4 37 4 
AVERAGE 99 21 0 0 99 21 
Payment  
(900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 205 41 185 21 389 62 
BFH-M 158 31 100 12 258 43 
N-BFH-N-M 64 12 0 0 64 12 
N-BFH-M 0 0 28 7 28 7 
AVERAGE 103 20 0 0 103 20 
Policy mix 
(N 25% reduction + 
900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 220 44 181 15 401 59 
BFH-M 174 34 71 8 244 42 
N-BFH-N-M 64 12 0 0 64 12 
N-BFH-M 0 0 28 6 28 6 
AVERAGE 103 20 0 0 103 20 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Table 10. 
Agri-environmental policy simulations: Comparing land use and total production 
 Farmer Land use (parcel) Total production 
Abandoned land  Rice Wheat  Rice (kg) Wheat 
(kg) 
Regulation 
(N 50% reduction) 
BFH-N-M 0 50 11 27 859 6 742 
BFH-M 0 39 4 21 934 2 328 
N-BFH-N-M 0 13 0 7 384 0 
N-BFH-M 4 0 5 0 1 798 
AVERAGE 0 21 0 11 929 0 
Payment  
(900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 0 43 18 23 659 10 963 
BFH-M 0 33 10 18 279 5 774 
N-BFH-N-M 0 13 0 7 385 0 
N-BFH-M 0 0 9 0 2 740 
AVERAGE 0 21 0 11 930 0 
Policy mix 
(N 25% reduction + 
900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 0 46 15 25 447 9 317 
BFH-M 0 36 7 20 094 4 097 
N-BFH-N-M 0 13 0 7 385 0 
N-BFH-M 2 0 7 0 2 288 
AVERAGE 0 21 0 11 930 0 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
The environmental impacts also depend on policy measures and farm types (Table 11). Because of the reduced 
application of chemical fertiliser, there is a significant reduction in N runoff and increase in N purification 
compared with the private optimum (Table 7) for the regulation and policy mix measures. However, the 
payment for N reduction provides farmers with an incentive to allocate more parcels to wheat production or 
cultivate underused parcels under the private optimum, which increases N runoff for business farm household 
and non-business farm household in mountainous areas. Regulation reduces the N runoff the most among the 
three policy simulations, while the increased application of organic fertiliser raises CH4 emissions in all cases. 
However, reduced N2O and increased carbon sequestration through the application of organic fertiliser 
significantly decreases net GHG emissions compared with emissions under the private optimum for all 
simulations and all farm types. 
 
Table 11. 
Agri-environmental policy simulations: Comparing environmental effects 
 Farmer Nitrogen1 GHG emission and sequestration1 
N runoff (purification) 
(kg) 
CH4(t)    N2O (t)   CO2 (t)   Total (t)   
Regulation 
(N 50% reduction) 
BFH-N-M -25.59  2.25  2.23  -9.34  -4.86  
BFH-M -31.85  1.76  1.36  -6.84  -3.72  
N-BFH-N-M -14.10  0.59  0.35  -2.16  -1.22  
N-BFH-M -13.03  0.00  0.32  -0.32  0.01  
AVERAGE -22.78  0.95  0.56  -3.49  -1.98  
Payment  
(900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 18.85  1.92  2.89  -8.47  -3.65  
BFH-M 39.83  1.48  2.00  -6.16  -2.68  
N-BFH-N-M -8.36  0.58  0.37  -2.11  -1.15  
N-BFH-M 67.77  0.00  0.74  -0.51  0.23  
AVERAGE -22.66  0.94  0.56  -3.40  -1.90  
Policy mix 
(N 25% reduction + 
900JPY/ 
N1kg reduction) 
BFH-N-M 17.23  2.06  2.66  -8.53  -3.80  
BFH-M -13.98  1.61  1.61  -6.40  -3.18  
N-BFH-N-M -14.03  0.58  0.34  -2.11  -1.18  
N-BFH-M 14.72  0.00  0.38  -0.48  -0.09  
AVERAGE -22.66  0.94  0.56  -3.40  -1.90  
1. The minus represents the purification for nitrogen and the sequestration for carbon. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 12 summarises the profit and social welfare under the three simulations. Regulation improves social 
welfare the most compared with the private optimum. However, farmers’ profits decrease under this scenario 
even though they create environmental benefits for society through N purification and GHG sequestration (see 
Table 11). By contrast, the environmental payment increases farmers’ profits significantly but does not 
necessarily improve social welfare because of the large budgetary costs of the policy and land allocation shifts 
to wheat. For business farm household in mountainous areas and non-business farm household in 
mountainous and non-mountainous areas, social welfare even worsens compared with under the private 
optimum. Lastly, the policy mix improves social welfare compared with the private optimum without reducing 
farmers’ profits. 
Table 12. 
Agri-environmental policy simulations: Comparing private profits and social welfare 
 Farmer Profits 
(1000 
JPY) 
Profit+ 
paymen
t 
(1000 
JPY) 
Profits/ 
Private 
optimu
m 
Budget 
outlays 
(1000 
JPY) 
Runoff 
damage1 
(purificatio
n benefit) 
GHG emission 
damage1 
(Sequestratio
n  
benefit) 
Social 
welfare 
(1000 
JPY) 
Social 
welfare/ 
Social 
optimum 
Regulation 
(N 50% 
reduction) 
BFH-N-M 2 082 2 082 0.92 0 -305 -34 2 421 0.94 
BFH-M 1 035 1 035 0.90 0 -259 -26 1 321 0.95 
N-BFH-N-M 233 233 0.89 0 -93 -9 334 0.97 
N-BFH-M 25 25 0.66 0 23 -0.1 2 0.25 
AVERAGE 526 526 0.92 0 -149 -14 689 0.98 
Payment  
(900JPY/ 
N1kg 
reduction) 
BFH-N-M 2 134 2 389 1.06 255 -190 -26 2 349 0.91 
BFH-M 1 081 1 263 1.10 182 -29 -19 1 105 0.79 
N-BFH-N-M 235 288 1.10 53 -55 -8 298 0.87 
N-BFH-M -12 72 1.89 85 120 2 -134 -15.79 
AVERAGE 527 615 1.07 89 -149 -13 689 0.98 
Policy mix 
(N 25% 
reduction 
+ 900JPY/ 
N1kg 
reduction) 
BFH-N-M 2 159 2 241 0.99 82 -208 -27 2 394 0.93 
BFH-M 1 058 1 138 0.99 80 -211 -22 1 292 0.93 
N-BFH-N-M 235 260 1.00 25 -92 -8 335 0.98 
N-BFH-M 4 47 1.23 43 26 -1 -21 -2.51 
AVERAGE 530 571 1.00 41 -149 -13 692 0.98 
1. The minus represents the purification for nitrogen and the sequestration for carbon. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
In summary, there are significant differences among the three policy scenarios in terms of cost burdens. Under 
the regulation policy, since all the costs for achieving the environmental target (50% reduction in N 
application) are borne by farmers (Case A), farmers’ profits are the lowest, but there are no budget outlays. By 
contrast, under the environmental payment policy, since farmers are remunerated for producing 
environmental benefits (Case B), their profits are highest with the highest budget outlays, which are covered 
by taxpayers. Thus, the costs for achieving environmental targets are now transferred from farmers to 
taxpayers. The policy mix of regulation and payment asks both farmers and taxpayers to bear the cost of 
achieving the environmental target (Case C). Therefore, farmers’ profits are larger than they are in the case of 
the regulation, but lower than they are in the case of the payment; moreover, budget outlays are smaller than 
they are under the payment policy, but larger than they are under the regulation policy. 
Depending on farm type, land use allocation, production, and environmental externalities also vary. For 
average farmers, all the policy simulations improve social welfare (0.98) compared with the private optimum 
(0.94). However, these three policy measures do not necessarily improve social welfare for all farmers. In 
particular, non-business farm household in mountainous areas create negative social impacts because of their 
high production costs and the high N runoff associated with land on steep slopes. Indeed, even after the 
introduction of the environmental payment and the policy mix, social welfare remains negative. These farm-
related environmental impacts suggest that more targeted approaches are necessary rather than developing 
agri-environmental policies that target the average farmer. 
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The presented simulation results suggest that the policy mix is the preferred measure in terms of economics, 
benefits to the environment, and equity and cost sharing. However, although farmers are producing 
environmental benefits, their private profits do not increase compared with the private optimum. The 
question thus remains of whether remuneration and incentives for farmers who adopt good farming practices 
is enough. One way in which to design a better policy mix would be to develop a measure that targets business 
farm household. This targeted policy may make it possible to reallocate the budget used for non-business farm 
household to business farm household, increasing their profits under the current budget ceiling as well as 
improving the environment and social welfare through the reduction of costly farming by non-business farm 
household, especially in mountainous areas. 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study used the SAPIM in order to analyse the degree to which agricultural policies address the increasing 
consumer demand for environmentally friendly products in Japan. In particular, it identified the environmental 
effects of different agricultural policies based on farms’ characteristics. Three agri-environmental policy 
simulations were selected based on the OECD reference level framework, the results of which indicate that 
these policies affect land use, production, and environmental externalities. According to the simulation results, 
a policy mix of regulation and an environmental payment reduces the impact on the environment and keeps 
farmers’ profits high. 
This study was based on a set of key assumptions relating to output prices, input prices, and the valuation of 
environmental externalities. The key source of uncertainty is arguably associated with the valuation of social 
benefits. To test the sensitivity of the presented results, we followed Pannell (1997) to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis by changing the monetary value of N runoff (purification) and GHG emissions by 10% and 30%. We 
found that all the key findings of this study continue to hold within the range of the sensitivity analysis, 
suggesting that even a 30% shock does not change the results obtained fundamentally. 
This integrated model approach is subject to limitations with respect to the data, model parameters, and 
economic and biophysical relationships. However, this approach remains a valuable tool for enabling 
policymakers to design and implement effective and efficient policies and move towards a sustainable food 
system. 
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